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1. Introduction 
 
The examination of argumentative discourse is the exploration of a very knotty 
type of communication. Dating back to Greek times, the study of argumentation 
has been approached from divergent angles over centuries. Colliding outlooks that 
stem from the ancient disciplines of logic, rhetoric and dialectic have been held, 
but theoretical affinities and mutual influences between the various perspectives in 
the field have also been detected. The modern theory of argumentation has under-
gone marked developments in a variety of directions, which have turned it into one 
of the most heterogeneous scholarly fields. Pragma-dialectics is an approach to 
argumentation initiated by Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst in the 1970s 
at the Speech Communication Department of the University of Amsterdam. It has 
gained ground among the most recent and popular multidisciplinary approaches to 
argumentative discourse. The model is distinguished by a set of theoretical 
assumptions regarding the nature of argument which are translated into procedural 
tools to analyse this kind of discourse. It has been applied to the examination of a 
variety of spoken and written argumentative genres, yielding practical outcomes. 
 
2. General Orientation of Pragma-dialectics 
In the literature, an important distinction in approaching argumentative discourse is 
drawn between the descriptive movement and the normative (or critical) one. The 
paragma-dialectical theory pursues a binary perspective which unites normativity 
and description as regards its object of study. Descriptivists advocate an empirical 
examination of the real use of language. Van Eemeren et al. (1993) elucidate that it 
is the practice of linguists to favour empirical investigation of discourse as a 
sample of actual verbal communicative experience. It is optimal for them to be 
impartial towards the data under examination, and this is considered a basic 
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building block of linguistic science. They also clarify that humanistic research, 
such as in modern logic and rhetoric, is normative, for it takes an evaluative 
attitude as regards argumentative practice. It tries to evaluate the way people argue. 
Formal logicians, for example, opt for an idealised investigation, namely, assessing 
argumentative language by reference to some pre-established norms of 
reasonableness. This perspective is not so much concerned with how people 
actually do argue as much as with how they should argue. The research programme 
which underlies the pragma-dialectical approach brings together the 
methodological poles of linguists and logicians by reconciling their empirical and 
regimental tendencies without undermining the essence of each, as van Eemeren, et 
al. (1993) put it, “We believe this integration can occur without reducing normative 
principles for reasonable discussion to anthropologically relative characterisations, 
and likewise without prefiguring the categories and principles of descriptive 
inquiry in a way that makes them immune to empirical disconfirmation” (pp. 1-2). 
Van Eemeren et al. (1996) argue that the two perspectives are apparently separate, 
but combining them constitutes an interesting outlook on which they establish their 
own theory of pragma-dialectics. 
Like any approach to an already established area of investigation with a respectable 
history, pragma-dialectics handles argumentative discourse in interdisciplinary 
terms, aiming at its improvement. On the one hand, pragma-dialectics gives 
argumentation a pragmatic account by considering it from a speech act perspective. 
It is built partly on the Speech Act Theory. On the other hand, the procedural 
dialectical conceptualisation of argument, as opposed to the logical or rhetorical 
ones (Wenzel, 1992), gives the approach its normative orientation. This integration 
of insights gives the theory its actual shape and locates it in area that can safely be 
dubbed normative pragmatics. Pragma-dialecticians hold that unilateral approaches 
do not do justice to argumentative discourse. That is, adopting either a 
“descriptive” orientation or a “normative” one seems to be a partial treatment of 
the subject. Thus, they call for a comprehensive research programme which fuses 
these apparently irreconcilable outlooks in one model. Normative pragmatics has 
been expounded on at length in the basic literature on the subject (van Eemeren, 
1992; van Eemeren et al., 1993; van Eemeren et al., 1996; van Eemeren & 
Grootendorst, 1992; van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004).  
 
3. Meta-Theoretical Principles of Pragma-Dialectics 
The initiators of pragma-dialectics construe it as the outcome of a whole research 
programme, which concretizes their general normative-descriptive orientation and 
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which consists of a number of interrelated components. Van Eemeren (1992), and 
van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004) distinguish five “estates” in the study of 
argumentation. They argue that a research programme that would account satis-
factorily for argumentation with regard to its nature is the one that endeavours to 
unite methodically various realms considering them as interdependent parts. The 
five realms are (1) the philosophical estate, (2) the theoretical estate, (3) the 
analytical (or reconstruction) estate, (4) the empirical estate and (5) the practical 
estate. Also, they formulate four starting points for their approach to realize the 
objectives of the general programme. The four meta-theoretical principles, as 
developed by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984), aim at handling argumen-
tation more adequately. This embraces the externalisation, functionalisation, 
socialisation and dialectification of the object of study. 
The principle of externalisation, as explained in van Eemerenet al. (1996), states 
that argumentation is not an internal frame of mind or a psychological tendency, 
nor is it an abstracted personal chain of reasoning that starts from a set of premises 
leading logically to a conclusion. Pragma-dialecticians hold that the study of 
argumentation does not involve speculation on interior predispositions, even if they 
do contain potential mismatched views. It is rather concerned with what is said 
actually by a speaker in terms of implicit or explicit speech acts. The verbally 
expressed disparity of views, the commitments undertaken when performing 
argumentative speech acts in a given context and the resulting consequences form a 
focal object of study. It is stressed that a speaker is only held responsible for an 
argumentative position when the latter is publicly projected in discourse. 
Externalisation then shifts the investigation of argumentation from the 
philosophical sphere to a more objective sphere. By adopting this principle, 
pragma-dialectics satisfies the linguistic descriptive requirement as regards its 
object of study since it deals with the observable, actual utterances rather than mere 
speculations, intentions or other non-empirical constructs. This allows the analyst 
to make use of experimental tools when dealing with argumentation, hence 
positioning pragma-dialectics itself within the highly non-speculative approaches. 
The principle of functionalisation states that argumentation should not be thought 
of as an isolated product, but rather as an ongoing verbal process closely bound to 
its context (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984). The utterances that compose 
argumentative discourse are regarded as purposive bits of language whose 
performance relates to precise conditions and whose ultimate function is the 
resolution of disagreement: 
Our view departs from a strictly structural view of argument by 
emphasizing the function of argument in managing the resolution 
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of disagreements. An emphasis on the functions of argumentation 
and on the interactional processes within which it occurs, allows 
us to describe and to evaluate argumentation according to its 
purposes. (Van Eemeren et al., 1993, p. 13) 
Functionalisation is thus to stress the purpose for which argumentative utterances 
are performed in the process of communication by treating them as speech acts 
which are performed in the context of a resolving a difference of opinion. 
The principle of socialisation accentuates the interactional dialogic nature of 
argumentation. Starting from the perspective that argumentation aims at convincing 
another party of the acceptability of a standpoint, the monologic treatment of the 
subject of study seems to be defective. Socialisation is fulfilled if the utterances 
produced by speakers are handled as segments of a dialogue between two or more 
parties, who presupposedly hold opposing roles: that of a protagonist and that of a 
real or anticipated antagonist. The two parties attempt jointly to resolve a 
divergence of viewpoints. Van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Snoeck Henkemans, et al. 
(1993), in this connection, state:  
[Argumentation] is part of a procedure whereby two or more 
individuals who have a difference of opinion try to arrive at 
agreement ... It reflects the collaboration in which the protagonist 
in the fundamentally dialogical interaction responds to the _real 
or projected_ questions, doubts, objections and counterclaims of 
the antagonist. (p.277)  
By locating the verbal productions of the participants in such an interactional 
context, it would be possible to specify the real meanings of their speech acts on 
the basis of their roles in the interaction. On account of this, it seems more 
adequate in pragma-dialectics to study argumentation as an outcome of a 
surrounding social context. 
The principle of dialectification assesses argumentative language in terms of some 
pre-established norms of a critical discussion whose aim is to resolve a disparity of 
opinion. These rules form a procedure that determines which speech acts play a 
productive role for the resolution to be achieved. Therefore, the discussion taking 
place is designated as a “regimented” discussion (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 
2004). This gives pragma-dialectics its normative orientation and represents the 
theoretical foundation on which the ideal model of a critical discussion, as 
elaborated by the theorists of this approach, is built. It is against this model that 
actual argumentative practice is evaluated. It is important to note, as van Eemeren 
and Grootendorst (1992) argue, that a critical discussion can be explicit or implicit. 
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When it is implicit, the speaker or writer envisages the way a standpoint might be 
received by a doubtful listener or reader and hence projects arguments to remove 
such anticipated doubts. 
Taken together, the four principles of externalisation, functionalisation, 
socialisation and dialectification constitute a sound basis in the light of which the 
following cardinal definition of argumentation in the pragma-dialectical approach 
is suggested: 
Argumentation is a speech act consisting of a constellation of 
statements designed to justify or refute an expressed opinion and 
calculated in a regimented discussion to convince a rational judge of 
a particular standpoint of the acceptability or unacceptability of that 
expressed opinion. (Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984, p. 18)  
This definition summarises the four pillars of the pragma-dialectical 
conceptualisation of argumentation. First, it regards it as a speech act, in line with 
the functionalisation and externalisation principles. Also, it displays its dialogic 
nature, in line with the socialisation principle by recognising that there is a second 
party to whom argumentation is addressed. What is more, it conceives of argument 
as part of a regimented discussion, thus conforming to the dialectification principle. 
All in all, the four meta-theoretical principles are outlined to fix the central 
methodological pathways which the whole approach follows.  
 
4. Applying Speech Act Theory to Argumentation 
The pragmatic aspect of pragma-dialectics unfolds in its treatment of 
argumentation within the framework of the speech act theory, as laid down by 
Austin (1962) and developed later by Searle (1969, 1975a and 1975b) but with 
some adaptation. This is attained through considering the argumentative moves of 
argumentation as speech acts. It is therefore necessary to give paramount 
importance to the performance of these moves, the effects this performance has on 
the listener and the conditions under which it takes place. Van Eemeren and 
Grootendorst (1984) give a thorough discussion of how speech act theory is applied 
to the analysis of argumentative discourse. The whole paradigm is embedded 
within a postulated framework called the “ideal model of a critical discussion”. 
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4.1. The Conceptualisation of Argumentation in Pragma-dialectics 
Pragma-dialecticians endeavour to offer a clear-cut definition to the argumentation 
seen as a speech act. In line with Austin’s and Searle’s outlooks, argumentation is 
regarded as an illocutionary act connected to the perlocutionary act of convincing, 
but because of some observed problems in the earlier speech act models, notably 
their restrictedness only to sentences with explicit illocutionary force and the one-
to-one relationship between isolated sentences and illocutions, the notion 
compound illocution, or illocutionary act complex has been introduced: 
We believe that argumentation can be treated as an illocutionary 
act complex. This act complex is composed of elementary 
illocutions which belong to the category of assertives and which 
at sentence level maintain a one-to-one ratio with (grammatical) 
sentences. The total constellation of the elementary illocutions 
constitutes the illocutionary act complex of argumentation, which 
at a higher textual level maintains, as a single whole, a one-to-one 
ratio with a (grammatical) sentence sequence. (Van Eemeren & 
Grootendorst, 1992, p.34) 
In this perspective, argumentation is construed as an illocutionary act related to a 
whole piece of discourse rather than a single sentence. The component parts belong 
to the category Searle (1975a) calls assertives. Taken together, however, they 
jointly have the communicative function of arguing and may lead to the 
interactional consequence of convincing. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992) 
enumerate other differences between the speech act of argumentation and 
“elementary” speech acts, such as asserting, requesting, promising . . . on the one 
hand, and other complex speech acts, such as amplifying, elucidating and 
explaining on the other.  
A further borrowing from the speech act theory appears in specifying the felicity 
conditions under which the performance of the speech act complex of 
argumentation is believed to be successful, as shown in Table 1. Pragma-
dialecticians take as a starting point the fact that a speaker S has addressed to a 
listener L numerous statements which belong to the category of the assertives and 
which collectively form a constellation of statements (S1, S2,…Sn) that acts as pro-
argumentation or contra-argumentation for an expressed opinion O. 
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Table 1 
Felicity Conditions of the Speech Act Complex of Argumentation 
Condition Pro-argumentation Contra-argumentation 
1. The 
Propositional 
Content Condition 
The constellation of statements 
S1, S2 (. . . Sn) consists of 
assertives in which 
propositions are expressed. 
                            
" 
2. The Essential 
Condition 
Advancing the constellation of 
statements S1, S2 (. . . Sn) 
counts as an attempt by S to 
justify O to L's satisfaction, i.e. 
to convince L of the 
acceptability of O. 
Advancing the constellation of 
statements S1, S2 (. . . Sn) counts as 
an attempt by S to refute O to L's 
satisfaction, i.e. to convince L of 
the unacceptability of O. 
3. Preparatory 
Condition 
1. S believes that L does not (in 
advance, completely, 
automatically) accept the 
expressed opinion O. 
2. S believes L will accept the 
propositions expressed in the 
statements S1, S2 (. . . Sn) 
3. S believes that L will accept 
the constellation of statements 
S1, S2 (. . . Sn) as a justification 
of O.  
1. S believes that L (for the time 
being, in whole or in part, more or 
less) accepts the expressed 
opinion O. 
2. S believes L will accept the 
propositions expressed in the 
statements S1, S2 (. . . Sn) 
3. S believes that L will accept the 
constellation of statements S1, S2 
(.. . Sn) as a refutation of O.  
4. Sincerity 
Condition 
1. S believes that O is 
acceptable. 
2. S believes that the 
propositions expressed in the 
statements S1, S2 (. . . Sn) are 
acceptable. 
3. S believes that the 
constellation of statements S1, 
S2 (. . . Sn) constitutes an 
acceptable justification of O. 
1. S believes that O is 
unacceptable. 
 
2. S believes that the propositions 
expressed in the statements S1, S2 
(. . . Sn) are acceptable. 
 
3. S believes that the constellation 
of statements S1, S2 (. . . Sn) 
constitutes an acceptable 
refutation of O. 
Note. S = speaker; L = hearer; O = opinion; Sn = statement number n. Adapted 
from Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions, by F. van Eemeren, 1992. 
4.2. The Model of a Critical Discussion 
Argumentative discourse in pragma-dialectics has a dialectical nature in relation to 
the dialectification principle. The participants are believed to be engaged in an 
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argumentative discussion in which the first party (the protagonist) defends a 
standpoint and the second party (the antagonist) raises doubts against it. In the 
course of this discussion, the former attempts to convince the latter of the 
acceptability of their standpoints, while the latter keeps expressing their doubts or 
objections to these standpoints (van Eemeren, Grootendorst & Snoeck Henkemans, 
2002). An ideal model of a critical discussion is designed to provide a kind of 
regimentation to the practice of argumentation. The quality of argumentative 
exchanges is measured by reference to some standards of reasonableness extracted 
from this model. Basically, the ideal model of a critical discussion indicates the 
stages which interlocutors have to go through together with the relevant 
argumentative moves (in terms of speech acts) which they have to perform at each 
stage for the resolution of the dispute to be accomplished.  
4.2.1. Dialectical Stages  
Four dialectical stages can be distinguished in the process of resolving a difference 
of opinion, which the participants in an argumentative exchange of views have to 
pass through. These stages comply with the phases of a critical discussion. The first 
phase is the confrontation stage. At this level a disparity of opinion arises by 
advancing a standpoint and its being subjected to questioning or doubt. It is argued 
that this stage is a prerequisite for a critical discussion to take place (van Eemeren 
& Grootendorst, 2004). The second phase is the opening stage. It is at this juncture 
that interlocutors assume roles of a protagonist and antagonist, hence allowing a 
discussion to start, but without an ample common point of departure, a critical 
exchange of views would not be meaningful, as van Eemerenet al. (1996) put it: 
It only makes sense to undertake an attempt to eliminate a difference 
of opinion by means of argumentation if such a starting point can be 
established. If there is no opening for exchanging views, then having 
a critical discussion is of no use. (p. 282) 
The third stage is the argumentation stage. It is so called for it is the core of the 
critical discussion: discussants advance arguments for and against a standpoint in a 
critical manner for the purpose of resolving the difference of opinion. The way 
arguments hang together may take various forms. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 
(2004) see that advancing and critically evaluating argumentation together form 
necessary and inseparable building blocks of this phase. The fourth stage, the 
concluding stage, is in essence the level at which the result of the discussion 
unfolds by resolving a difference of opinion in favour of one of the parties: either 
accepting the protagonist’s standpoint and withdrawing the antagonist’s doubts or 
retracting the standpoint itself, which signals its unacceptability. In van Eemeren’s 
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terms, concluding a discussion is determining “who won”. At this point further 
differences of opinion might emerge and new discussions might start, with slight or 
radical modifications.  
If one attempts to measure the degree to which the practice of argumentation 
conforms to the postulated stages of the ideal model, one would certainly observe 
the vast disparity between them. Van Eemeren (2015) in this respect, alleges“[the 
ideal model] does not provide a true-to-life description of argumentative reality . . . 
argumentative discourse rarely, if ever, corresponds exactly to the ideal model” 
(p.491). The model is construed as having two crucial functions: a heuristic (or 
analytic) function and a critical function. The heuristic function is to guide the 
analyst in specifying and interpreting the aspects and elements needed for the 
evaluation of argumentation. The critical function is to establish standards 
according to which the speech acts constituting the exchange are judged as 
conforming to or deviating from a procedure that is resolution oriented (van 
Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992; van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004; van Eemeren, 
Houtlosser & Snoeck Henkemans, 2007).  
4.2.2. Speech Acts in a Critical Discussion 
Starting from Searle’s (1975a) five-fold classification of speech acts into 
assertives, declaratives, commissives, expressives and directives, an attempt is 
made in pragma-dialectics to specify what speech acts do contribute to the 
resolution of a dispute in a critical discussion at the different stages. Generally, van 
Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984) see that the performance of speech acts by 
language users engaged in a discussion is confined just to assertives, commissives 
and directives, discarding declaratives and expressives in connection with what 
each language user should “do” at each stage and the contribution of his move to 
the resolution of the dispute. They also indicate that the only permissible 
operations in the discussion are those of negation and repetition.  
4.2.3. Rules of a Critical Discussion and Fallacies 
The ideal model of a critical discussion, as explained above, permits language users 
to undertake a critical discussion that is resolution oriented. Pragma-dialecticians 
add that along the different stages of the discussion, language users have to comply 
with a discussion procedure, the rules of which form a code of conduct. Any 
argumentative move that transgresses the code of conduct is regarded as a fallacy, 
using the traditional terminology. In what follows a brief account of the nature of 
the rules suggested and their related fallacies is presented.  
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To start with, in Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions (1984), van Eemeren 
and Grootendorst set a meticulous technical inventory of seventeen rules aimed at 
guiding rational discussants in their endeavour to resolve the dispute at issue. In 
this respect, they explain, “The rules we have formulated relate to the performance 
of speech acts in argumentative discussions and indicate the conditions that the 
usage of language users in a discussion has to meet in order to be able to contribute 
to the resolution of a dispute” (p. 175). It appears here that the gist of the code of 
conduct is the speech acts externalised by speakers and the directives governing 
their performance by interlocutors to settle a disagreement. The rules of discussion 
are meant to qualify language users to conduct themselves as rational discussants in 
addition to deterring anything that could hinder the resolution process. Elsewhere, 
the dialectical rules that represent a code of conduct are condensed in a simplified 
version to ten basic principles, or the “ten commandments” of a critical discussion 
(van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992; van Eemeren et al., 1996; van Eemeren, 
Grootendorst & Snoeck Henkemans, 2002). They demonstrate how each one helps 
the interlocutors to arrive at fixing a dispute. The ten fundamental rules of the code 
of conduct are listed below: 
RULE 1: (Freedom rule) Parties must not prevent each other from putting 
forward standpoints or casting doubt on standpoints. 
RULE 2: (Burden-of-proof rule) A party who puts forward a standpoint is 
obliged to defend it if asked to do so. 
RULE 3: (Standpoint rule) A party’s attack on a standpoint must relate to 
the standpoint that has indeed been advanced by the other party. 
RULE 4: (Relevance rule) A party may defend his or her standpoint only by 
advancing argumentation related to that standpoint. 
RULE 5: (Unexpressed premise rule) A party may not falsely present 
something as a premise that has been left unexpressed by the other 
party or deny a premise that he or she has left implicit. 
RULE 6: (Starting point rule) No party may falsely present a premise as an 
accepted starting point, or deny a premise representing an accepted 
starting point. 
 
RULE 7: 
(Argument Scheme rule) A standpoint may not be regarded as 
conclusively defended if the defence does not take place by means 
of an appropriate argument scheme that is correctly applied. 
RULE 8: (Validity rule) The reasoning in the argumentation must be 
logically valid or must be capable of being made valid by making 
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explicit one or more unexpressed premises. 
RULE 9: (Closure rule) A failed defense of a standpoint must result in the 
protagonist retracting the standpoint, and a successful defense of a 
standpoint must result in the antagonist retracting his or her doubts. 
RULE 10: (Usage rule) Parties must not use any formulations that are 
insufficiently clear or confusingly ambiguous, and they must 
interpret the formulations of the other party as carefully and 
accurately as possible. 
Although the rules sketched out above are held to be conductive to fixing a dispute, 
pragma-dialecticians do assert that they are just necessary but by no means 
satisfactory in practice. Other factors are deemed to contribute to the resolution 
(van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004). 
Setting rules for argumentative discussions is the initial step to enter the area of 
fallacies in argumentation. By definition, a fallacy is a “deficient move” in 
argumentative discourse (van Eemeren, 2001a). In the pragma-dialectical 
framework, the deficiency of an argumentative move can only be determined if one 
refers to the code of conduct suggested in the theory, being the touchstone against 
which argumentative practice is evaluated. On this basis, a fallacy in this 
perspective is a violation by one of the parties engaged in a discussion, at any of 
the stages of the ideal model of a critical discussion, of some of the rules for the 
performance of speech acts that are conductive to the resolution. Van Eemeren 
(2001b) clarifies, “Only after it has become clear which specific criterion for 
satisfying a norm pertaining to a particular stage of the resolution process has not 
been met can it be determined which fallacy has been committed” (p.300). In brief, 
a fallacy can be said to be a speech act non-conforming to the rules of a critical 
discussion. Starting from the rules that constitute the code of conduct, pragma-
dialecticians classify the fallacies into ten basic categories, with subtypes, 
according to the rule being violated. In addition to that, they add a number of other 
fallacies that might intervene with the accomplishment of the resolution of the 
difference of opinion. Considering the rules that discussants have to adhere to and 
their related infringements, one could clearly perceive the normative orientation of 
the pragma-dialectical approach. 
5. Reconstructing Argumentative Discourse 
It has been shown that naturally occurring argumentative discourse, like many sorts 
of discourse, appears to pose difficulties of interpretation for analysts attempting to 
describe and assess its content. This is basically due to the fact that such content 
might not always be explicit or straightforward, or it might contain elements that 
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cannot be said to belong to argumentation proper. On these grounds, the analyst 
has to reconstruct the discourse under examination in a form that highlights the 
essential components constituting the core of the description and evaluation in 
order to arrive at a correct interpretation. Of course, as Van Rees (2001) observes, 
the process of reconstruction cannot be undertaken in a theoretical vacuum, but 
rather it should be sited in a given theoretical conception of argumentation and a 
set of related standards for its evaluation. In her words, “Argument reconstruction... 
involves identifying and isolating all those and only those elements that are 
relevant to the theoretical perspective and for the theoretical purpose of the 
analyst” (p.166).  
By defining argumentation as an attempt to resolve a difference of opinions 
through a regulated exchange of views within a model of a critical discussion, 
pragma-dialecticians attempt to provide a reconstruction of argumentative 
discourse with the objective of finding out the extent to which its pragmatic and 
dialectical layout leads to the resolution of the differences of opinion by focussing 
just on the aspects that are important for this resolution. Reconstruction, in this 
perspective, entails the production of an analytic overview, which unambiguously 
and comprehensively depicts the relevant parts of argumentation. When 
formulating an overview, the analyst makes use of specific operations and relies on 
precise linguistic and extra-linguistic contextual clues for an objective empirical 
justification of the reconstruction process.  
5.1. The Components of the Analytic Overview 
As regards the aspects of argumentative discourse which are crucial for the 
resolution of disputes, van Eemerenet al. (1996) point out that an adequate 
evaluation of argumentative discourse can only be reached if the analytic overview 
tackles a number of basic elements. These are (1) the standpoints existing in the 
discussion, (2) the positions assumed by the discussants together with their starting 
and concluding points, (3) the array of arguments advanced by the participants, (4) 
the structure of argumentation and (5) the argumentation schemes. To elucidate the 
outcomes of considering these aspects and their significance for the evaluation, a 
number of analytic questions can be formulated, as outlined in Table 2.  
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Table 2 
Components of an Analytic Overview and their Significance for Evaluation 
Aspect of 
discourse 
Analytic 
Question(s) 
Outcomes of 
Analysis 
Significance for 
evaluation 
1. Difference of 
opinion 
 
- What kind is 
the difference of 
opinion? 
 
Single non-mixed/ 
multiple non-mixed/ 
single mixed/ 
multiple mixed/  
Determining whether 
the existing 
difference has been 
resolved. 
2. Distribution of 
roles 
- Which roles 
are assumed by 
the participants? 
 
Protagonist/ 
antagonist 
Determining the party 
in whose favour the 
discussion has 
terminated. 
3. Arguments - What 
arguments are 
advanced in the 
discussion? 
- What premises 
are expressed/ 
unexpressed 
- An array of 
arguments 
- An array of 
premises (expressed/ 
unexpressed) 
Accounting 
thoroughly for the 
argumentation 
advanced in the 
discussion 
4. Argumentation 
structure 
- How are the 
arguments 
related to each 
other? 
Single/ multiple/ 
compound structure 
Assessing the 
adequacy and 
coherence of 
arguments 
5. Argumentation 
schemes 
- How are the 
premises related 
to the 
standpoints? 
Token/similarity/ 
consequence 
Assessing the 
relationship between 
premises and 
standpoints. 
 
Constructed in such a way, an analytic overview, as van Eemeren, Grootendorst, 
Jackson, et al. (1993) observe, offers a proper understanding of argumentative 
discourse, a possibility of explaining its coherence and a reliable foundation for its 
assessment. 
5.2. Analytic Operations 
Four analytic operations, or transformations, are made use of to cast discourse into 
a dialectical form: deletion, addition, substitution and permutation. Thus the 
discourse resulting from the reconstruction process may differ from the actual 
discourse in a number of ways. Van Eemeren (2006) considers these 
transformations as tools employed to externalize the commitments of participants, 
which form the ground for an adequate evaluation of argumentative discourse. 
According to Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1989), deletion consists in selecting 
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only those elements that are of direct relevance to the resolution process and 
eliminating every other element which seems superfluous, repetitive or digressive. 
Addition consists in appending the missing parts of discourse which are 
contributory to resolving the dispute but are left implicit or unexpressed. One can 
postulate the schema that represents the addition transformation as follows: 
Original formulation 
(incomplete) 
ADDITION 
(+ Y) 
 
Reconstruction 
X X + Y 
It is shown that one of the most frequent uses of this transformation is to render the 
communicative force of standpoints and arguments unequivocal where this is left 
hidden (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004). Substitution involves rephrasing the 
elements of discourse with regard to their function and disambiguating obscure 
expressions by using standard phrases instead. In the same way, the substitution 
transformation can be reduced to the schema below: 
Original 
formulation 
(indirect) 
SUBSTITUTION 
 
Reconstruction 
(direct) 
X Z 
 
Substitution is essentially made use of in cases of indirectness. An indirect 
standpoint or argumentation, which are usually confusing, are replaced by a direct 
standard formulation for them, allowing a single reading. For example, the 
directive, “Definitely ask her [Miriam]. By all means!” is substituted by the 
formulation: “My standpoint is that Miriam should be invited to John’s party” (van 
Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004). Permutation involves the rearrangement of the 
constituents of discourse following the stages of the ideal model of a critical 
discussion. By applying this transformation, the elements of discourse may 
maintain their original positions, or they may be shifted to comply with the ideal 
model structure. The four analytical transformations have the merit of interpreting 
the verbal moves comprising argumentative discourse in pragma-dialectical terms 
(van Eemeren et al., 1993).  
Conclusion 
The pragma-dialectical approach has brought the study of argumentation 
signbificant outcomes. Most importantly, the introduction of the pragmatic 
component made it possible to see argumentation from a functional angle. Further, 
the extension of the analysis over the sentential boundaries has broadened the 
scope of the Speech Act Theory itself, permitting the analyst to consider the way a 
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constellation of elementary speech acts acting together leads to the fulfillment of 
the higher order communicative goal of convincing. The normative layer of the 
approach appears in regarding argumentative discourse as a regulated, rule-
governed critical discussion. In recent years, pragma-dialecticians have recognized 
the need to bring argumentation to the contextual requirements together with 
reasonableness requirements for more effectiveness. This shift towards rhetorical 
concerns has led to a significant advancement in the pragma-dialectical approach 
by introducing the concept of strategic maneuvering. Van Eemeren (2010) argues 
that widening the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation in strategic 
maneuvering terms has the outcome of yielding more affluent and more accurate 
tools to explore and assess argumentative discourse. On the whole, the pragma-
dialectical approach has now become a major school of thought through the more 
specialized analyses which are undertaken by its initiators and followers in more 
specific domains of argumentative discourse.  
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Summary 
 
A Pragma-Dialectical Approach to Argumentative Discourse 
 
Touria Drid 
Kasdi Merbah University, Algeria 
 
Theoretical and procedural diverseness is a feature characterising the study of argumen-
tation. The common core in all perspectives is to examine a type of discourse that attempts 
to convince another party of the acceptability of one’s view(s) through a set of arguments, 
but what differs, to a larger or lesser extent, is the theoretical apparatus through which 
discourse is scrutinised. The present paper offers a general account of the pragma-dialec-
tical approach to argumentation. Expatiating on the principal theoretical and methodolo-
gical lines on which the theory proceeds, the paper aims at delineating the analytical tools 
provided in this paradigm to handle the intricacies of argumentative discourse.  
Keywords: Argumentation, dialectic, logic, pragma-dialectics, speech act. 
 
